This paper studies the impact of the creation of a new organ inside the Brazilian Judiciary structure, named the "National Council of Justice", which was the result of a specific constitutional amendment. The emersion of this new power created a huge discussion about the principle of separation of powers in the country, specially faced by the Supreme Court in Case nº 3367, decided in 2006. Firstly, the article shows the main arguments used by the most important Brazilian Court to confront the issue. Moreover, this research aims to present, in an original way discussed in the author's PhD thesis, a new function personally advocated for this "National Council of Justice" regarding the systematization of judgments under Brazilian judicial review framework. It could bring a new understanding of division of functions in Brazil and possibly in Latin America, considering the reality of its development by one entity which doesn´t belong to the democratic circuit.
INTRODUCTION
This research aims to study the impact of the creation of the National Council of Justice with regard to the debate about the possible violation of the separation of power principle, a subject discussed by the Supreme Court in assessing the unconstitutionality lawsuit No. 3367. In addition, after making a comparison with the institutional reality of some institutions in Europe and Latin America, the paper proposes the development of a new function for the National Council of Justice under judicial review, solution inspired on the Doctoral thesis defended by the author on the subject. Therefore, the research was divided into three topics that summarize the essence of the paper: (I) the creation of the National Council of Justice, here we intended to present the reasons why this institution was created in Brazil; (II) the analysis of ADI 3367, lawsuit filed before the Supreme Court and which questioned whether the creation of the National Council of Justice would violate the separation of power principle, the specific focus of the investigation; (III) justification for a new role for the National Council, an initiative that has the potential of improving judicial review in Brazil to ensure greater systematization of decisions given under the specific control of constitutionality and which can serve as inspiration for other institutional realities.
THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE IN BRAZIL
The debate concerning the necessary changes to improve the judiciary is an old one, and it has the aim of making its performance more efficient and expeditious. One could say that this debate has even of more significant relevance in Latin America, since this region historically does not have the same institutional solidity which can be observed in more developed countries, and the judiciary has a role in rescuing the hope for better days in a society which is still trying to guarantee fundamental rights. Brazil fits into this context: although it has made significant advances in recent years in its social indicators it still needs to advance the process of institutional strengthening.
I have chosen as the specific focus of this article the analysis of an instrument to strengthen Judiciary control, represented by the creation of the National Council of Justice in 2004. Among other important functions, the entity was established based on the perceived need to strengthen two relevant points in Judiciary action: (I) achieve genuine administrative, financial and functional control of the judiciary, by more rigorously inspecting any flaws observed in its activities, (II) develop a plan for the Judiciary Power, establishing goals for the Judiciary in order to improve its functionality.
The National Council of Justice now has its own prevision in the Brazilian Constitution, and the basic profile of its functions is found in Article 103-B. As one reads this article it is possible to realize, first of all, that there is a concern with the Members of the Council, which are mostly members of the Judiciary.
The National Council of Justice has 15 members with a two-year term, and only one reappointment is admitted. In it the most prominent is the President of the Supreme Court, who is also the President of the Council. The Judge of the Superior Court of Justice, who is chosen to serve in the Council, was given a Corregidor position, who is the person responsible for answering to complaints about deviations and taking appropriate action. The Council also occupies a strategic position in the context of the Brazilian judiciary, since the Supreme Court, the highest court of the Judiciary Power, can only review its decisions.
One could say that, ten years after its creation, the National Council of Justice has emerged as a successful solution for Brazilian adjudicative
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Revista Jurídica Piélagus practice and that it has also changed the profile of Brazilian courts. It represented "(...) a sort of flagship of the so-called Judicial Reform". It is also viewed as a sentinel in the search for the efficiency of that power. It was noticed for editing several normative acts which deal with the functioning of the judiciary, giving Brazilian Justice a more systematic strategic vision.
Given our focus, it is worth to briefly mention some international experiences of control of the Judiciary, which is an important step to contextualize the Brazilian debate on the subject. Beside the previously mentioned European experiences, the creation of Judiciary Councils has also echoed in Latin America, and the Brazilian experience is an example, which is the main focus of this study. Our region unfortunately has often only uncritically copied institutions that were designed in different institutional realities, and it is still a challenge to construct our own solutions for our specific problems, as noted by Jorge Esquirol.
BRIEF ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF JUDICIARY CONTROL
A brief analysis of the experiences previously mentioned with regard to discipline of the judicial function reveals a constant concern with career development of the Judges and the ethical rule of their actions. In Brazil, however, the creation of the National Council faced a strong objection, based on the argument that it would disrespect the separation of power principle. This is what we shall discuss in the next part of this article.
ADI 3367 AND THE SEPARATION OF POWER PRINCIPLE
Disagreeing with the creation of the National Council of Justice, the Association of Brazilian Magistrates -AMB proposed in the Supreme Court, a direct action of unconstitutionality. In Brazil, the judicial review actions may be filed by various entities, as defined in Article 103 of the Federal Constitution. In this particular case, the AMB mentioned Articles 1 and 2 of Constitutional Amendment No. 45/04, arguing that the creation of the National Council of Justice violated two constitutional principles: (I) the separation of power principle, (II) the federal pact 2. This is the most direct and thorough questioning faced by the Council in the judicial sphere, which has been mentioned in several papers written in Brazil on the subject.
The winning position: the constitutionality of the National Judicial Council
It is worth examining the arguments used by the current winning point of view in the Supreme Court, which defends the constitutionality of the creation of the National Council of Justice.
In this sense, the Rapporteur of the case, Juge Cezar Peluso, after making a historical analysis of the development of the separation of power principle, held to be possible the creation of the National Council of Justice according to the Brazilian Constitution, stating that "(...) it is an organ of the judiciary (art. 92, IA), composed mostly of members of the same Power (article 103-B), appointed without direct interference of other Powers. 2 " Juge Peluso tried to emphasize that the two attributions conferred by Constitutional Amendment to the National Council of Justice did not preclude the exercise of judicial functions and its performance, in fact, they contribute to enhance the functioning of the judiciary.
Since the specific focus of this research is on separation of powers, I will now examine the votes of the other Justices who participated in this argument. In this sense, the Juge Eros Grau is noteworthy. 
The position of the minority: violation of the principle of separation of powers
Nonetheless it is important to examine the arguments of the opposing view in the court. In particular, we highlight the view of t h e J u g e E l l e n Gracie, who argued that the creation of the National Council violates the principle of separation of powers. This Justice considered improper the participation of external members to the Judiciary as members of the National Council of Justice, which is a disregard to what she called "(...) a qualified independence of the Judiciary Power (...)". At the end, she was in favor of a partial declaration of unconstitutionality because the presence of members who have no relation to the judiciary would violate the separation of powers.
The Juge Carlos Velloso joined the vote of the Juge Ellen Gracie. When casting his vote, he cited the Judicial Council in France, noting that "(...) in France, when the issues are related to the magistrates, the members who are not a magistrate, do not vote (...)". He supported the need for the creation of a Council to control the administrative and financial operations of the judiciary and the proper discharge of official duties of judges and officials in Brazil, but he also disagreed with the presence of members who are not of the magistrate, but who are part of the Council of the Judiciary.
The Juge Sepúlveda Pertence was also contrary to members of the Judicial Council with no relation to the Judiciary. Although he did not disagreed with the creation of the National Council, he criticized the interference of the Legislature as far as its members are concerned , highlighting that the Supreme Councils of Italy and Portugal have imposed restrictions on the participation certain people in the Council. But Brazil did not do that, here citizens can serve terms and they can be reappointed to positions in the Council. Finally, unlike the other Justices who were part of the unsuccessful minority, Juge Sepúlveda Pertence only disagreed with the presence of citizens in the Council, but he did not consider the presence of lawyers and prosecutors a problem.
In turn, Justice Marco Aurélio held totally unfounded the action of unconstitutionality presented, having an isolated position in the context of the trial.
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: IN DEFENSE OF A NEW FUNCTION
Thus, in view of the dismissal of the argument that the National Council of Justice would represent a breach of the principle of separation of powers, and since a decade has passed since its creation in Brazil, it is worth reflecting on the next steps regarding the development of the Council. In this sense, I propose a new role for the National Council, a novelty that has the potential of contributing to the improvement of judicial review in Brazil or in other countries that have the same problem.
Like other constitutional experiences of American influence, the Brazilian judicial review ensures that any Judge or Court may, in an action submitted to it, disregard any law or normative act on grounds of unconstitutionality. In this situation, the Brazilian practice of judicial review has absorbed the American system, which is based on the famous case Marbury vs. Madison in the year 1803. This case is a notorious decision reference of judicial review, and even before the existence of relevant precedents, it continues to bear special significance. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, writing about the case, believed it was a "velvet revolution" in the context of global control. Given the focus of this research, I will now examine a specific trait of the American influence control in Brazil, which is also known as concrete control: the absence of statistical and detailed knowledge concerning cases in which unconstitutionality was declared by the Judges and by the Courts.
The national practical experience shows that there is no systematic knowledge of several cases in which judges and courts decide to oust the application. Namely, of the law that offends the Constitution. In Brazil the possibility of declaring unconstitutionality is guaranteed, but on the other hand, there is no systematization of laws are usually declared unconstitutional by the Justice in concrete cases, nor is it possible to know which the arguments are commonly used to support unconstitutionality.
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This gap proves to be problematic, as this lack of knowledge enables the proliferation of judicial decisions that exclude the application of laws passed by the Brazilian legislature, and which continue to be the general rule in the country. This point needs to be better elucidated: in the general control of Brazilian constitutionality the law is enforced only in case some judges or courts have such understanding. In short, the law is still valid in the abstract framework, and its application is rejected only in individual case.
From surveys conducted in this Doctoral thesis, I argue that the National Council of Justice should edit resolution mapping parameters concerning the need for communication to the Council, by electronic means, about any case where there is a decision of unconstitutionality. Therefore, I advocate the creation of a "National Registry of Unconstitutionality Decisions". This would enable the National Council of Justice to truly know the situations in which a law was not enforced due to fact that it disrespect the Constitution. The previously mentioned registry could be created in a simple way, based on the existence of similar registries, which were also designed by the Council for other issues in which the need of systematization had been noticed long before.
The paradoxical conclusion is that Brazil still has not systematized knowledge on a subject that should receive greater attention: the cases in which a law is declared unconstitutional by the judiciary.
It is worth noting that the National Judicial Council has regulatory power and it may, according to the Brazilian Federal Constitution, edit acts necessary to carry out its function having as parameter the existence of a previous legal provision. The resolution of creating the National Registry of Unconstitutionality Decisions is in accordance with the assumptions previously mentioned, and it would result in greater knowledge of the purpose of such a relevant issue.
It would be the responsibility of the National Council the new function of registering cases of judicial review in Brazil, allowing open public debate on the issues which are the most discussed and arguments handled in court.
It is worth mentioning the importance of having a judiciary which functions appropriately and which ensures rights in places where the process of institutional strengthening is still slow. In this sense, a discussion about the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary is important, even though it is also peculiar in constitutional experiences such as the one in Brazil, where judicial decisions are frequently the way to guarantee rights that are not guaranteed by other Powers. In this sense, the debate of procedural and substantial theories has its own purposes, which cannot be approached with the desired depth due to the limitations of the research.
Therefore, by preserving the general traits that characterize the complexity of control practices in Brazil, the creation of the National Registry would be able of drawing a statistical framework of laws and normative acts. Which were declared unconstitutional by Judges and Courts in a concrete control of constitutionality, promoting its dissemination and actual knowledge on part of other actors in the Judiciary Power and on part of society.
By being aware of the reality of a concrete control we could ensure not only the doctrinal and jurisprudential understanding of the existing cases, but we could also acquire an important understanding of the practical functioning of public policies designed by the Legislative Power, which are the most common obstacles to its implementation. This perspective has greater importance in a region such as Latin America, where there is institutional instability and where the system is not mature enough to set aside the fear of having to face repeatedly a restrictive regime where fundamental rights are not guaranteed.
Thus, since the argument that the creation of the National Council of Justice would violate the separation of powers was not considered valid, now is the right time to create the body, which
